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I.

INTRODUCTION

In proclaiming National Drug Abuse Prevention Week, October
20-26, 1974, President Ford noted that during the past five years the
United States has given the highest priority to the elimination of the
drug trade which threatens "the very fabric of our society." During
this period, international drug traffic has seen its complexion change
with the establishment of the so-called "Latin-American Connection."
As the major port of entry from Latin-America and the southern
hemisphere, Miami has fallen heir to much of this illicit traffic.
Thus, in early 1974, in response to an interviewer's inquiry whether
Miami had replaced New York as the main port of entry during the
growth of the "Latin-American Connection," John R. Bartels, Administrator of Drug Enforcement, Department of Justice, replied, "It's
starting to, yes."'
The extensive Florida coastline and the island chain of the Florida
Keys present a formidable problem to all levels of law enforcement in
attempting to intercept drug smuggling activities. The inherent geographical problems are aggravated by the use of a technique formerly
employed by rumrunners shortly after prohibition, and likely to be
increasingly utilized by narcotic traffickers. The technique, which
minimizes the risk of arrest or conviction, involves the use of a boat
lying to or hovering on the high seas immediately beyond the 12-mile
limit of the United States' customs enforcement zone, out of jurisdictional reach of any state, awaiting either a pickup boat from shore or a
cover of fog or darkness to make a landing of the contraband. Fortunately, this technique is not as law enforcement-proof as most
smugglers would like to believe. If the vessel is owned or registered in
* This article, in less expanded form, appeared as an Ocean and Coastal Law Community
Legal Problem Services report in the University of Miami Sea Grant Institutional Program.
** Member of the Nebraska Bar; J.D. University of Nebraska; LL.M. Ocean and Coastal Law
Program, University of Miami Law School.
1. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Apr. 1, 1974, at 39.
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the United States, the Coast Guard is empowered to board and arrest
anywhere on the high seas in the effort to enforce laws falling under
the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction.
Although prosecution under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 19702 would seem the obvious method of
preventing smuggling of narcotics outside the three-mile territorial
limit, the possession of controlled substances on the high seas does not
fall within the Special Maritime Jurisdiction, apparently due to a
Congressional oversight. 3 However, another approach has successfully
been used. Assuming that most ventures of this sort involve more than
one actor and have been hatched as a joint product of several minds,
law enforcers have used the federal crime of conspiracy to perform
heavy duty as a backstop. 4 But though the charge of conspiring to
violate United States law is instrumental in drawing in all who have
been caught up in the web of conspiring, it, too, has limitations in the
dependence of its enforcement upon agent infiltration or informants
privy to the conspiracy and willing to testify to its existence.
Moreover, most conspiracy prosecutions proceed as if it were a requirement that at least one of the conspirators have committed an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, or that an agreement have
5
been made within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court.
2. 21 U.S.C.A §§ 801-803, 811, 812-829, 841-851, 871-886, 901-904, 951-966 (1970).
3. For an explanation of the criteria used to determine the intent of Congress as to which
laws fall within the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction, see note 5 infra.
4. Several cases using the conspiracy approach will be discussed later in this article.
5. Some indecisiveness appears to surround the question of whether conspiring to import a
controlled substance requires proof of the commission of an overt act. The common law crime of
conspiracy was indictable upon the formation of the agreement with no requirement of proving
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Since there are no federal common law crimes, a
general federal conspiracy statute was enacted which included the requirement that an overt act
in furtherance of the conspiracy be proved. 18 U.S.C. § 371. Numerous other federal criminal
statutes include self-contained conspiracy sections providing penalties for conspiring to violate
particular sections of the criminal law, often without requiring proof of an overt act. See, e.g.,
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) (a charge of conspiracy to restrain or monopolize
trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act need not allege an overt act) and Singer v.
United States, 323 U.S. 338 (1945) (same with respect to conspiracy to violate the Selective
Training and Service Act). These decisions are grounded on the principle that although conspiracy is part of a statutory offense, the particular section punishes it on a "common law footing"
not requiring proof of an overt act.
In United States v. Gardner, 202 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Cal. 1962) a Ninth Circuit District
Court convicted the defendants under §§ 174 and 176(a) of 21 U.S.C. (the predecessors to 21
U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 963-unlawful importation of controlled substances and attempt and
conspiracy) which created a separate conspiracy offense that need not refer to 18 U.S.C. § 371
and need not allege an overt act. This principle was cited approvingly by the Ninth Circuit in
Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1967) and Ewing v. United States, 386 F.2d 10
(9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 991 (1968) and has been followed in the Third Circuit,
United States v. DeLazo, 497 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1974) and the Seventh Circuit, United States v.
Garfoli, 324 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1963), being noted without resolving the question in the First
Circuit, United States v. Clayton, 450 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit, United States
v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966) and most recently in the Fifth Circuit, United States v.
Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975). While the Second Circuit has not ruled on the question, at
least one Second Circuit District Court has held that overt acts need not be alleged under the
new drug law, United States v. DeViteri, 350 F. Supp. 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Yet, even here, the Coast Guard is not impotent under statutory
authority to deal with the problem. Upon finding that vessels are
Since the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 contains a
separate section covering attempting or conspiring to import controlled substances, it would seem
unnecessary to allege overt acts within the court's jurisdiction. Since few of these criminal
enterprises are conceived solely outside of the United States' territory and some overt act within
the United States can usually be proven, drug importation conspiracy defendants continue to be
charged with the commission of overt acts, most likely due to an overabundance of caution on the
part of prosecutors fearful that a trial judge may not adhere to this line of cases supporting the
punishment of conspiracy on a "common law footing" and believing that the court's jurisdiction
stands on a more solid foundation when overt acts furthering the crime are committed within the
territorial United States.
While the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act contains no explicit
provision allowing it to fall within the United States Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction, this is not the sole determinant whether any of the Act's provisions apply beyond the United
States territorial limits. A distinction was pointed out in United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922) where, in reversing the District Court's sustaining of a demurrer to an indictment charging a
conspiracy to defraud the United States while the defendants were on board an American vessel on
the high seas, the Supreme Court commented on the applicability of the statute outside the United
States territorial limit:
We have in this case a question of statutory construction. The necessary locus, when not
specifically defined, depends upon the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description
and nature of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power and
jurisdiction of a government to punish crimes under the law of nations. Crimes against
private individuals or their property, like assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery,
arson, embezzlement and frauds of all kinds, which affect the peace and good order of
the community must, of course, be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
government where it may properly exercise it. If punishment of them is to be extended
to include those committed outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction it is natural for
Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of
Congress in this regard.
But the same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are,
as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the government's jurisdiction, but
are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction,
or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers, or
agents. Some such offenses can only be committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the government because of the local acts required to constitute them. Others are such
that to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail
the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as
easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign countries as at home. In
such cases, Congress has not thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law
that the locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it to be
inferred from the nature of the offense.
Id. at 97-98.
This latter principle was summarized and reaffirmed by the Court in Skiriotes v. Florida,
313 U.S. 69 (1941) at 73-74, citing Bowman:
Thus, a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the government,
and are capable of perpetration without regard to particular locality is to be construed
as applicable to citizens of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no express declaration to that effect.
A statute declaring importation of or conspiring or attempting to import certain substances to
be unlawful arguably deals with "acts that are directly injurious to the government" inasmuch as
,the nature of the offense presumes an activity having some origins beyond the United States
territorial limits. This is the rationale used in a Ninth Circuit decision, Brulay v. United States,
383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967) where the defendant was charged with conspiring to import
amphetamine tablets from Mexico in violation of the general smuggling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 545
and the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Court relied on the rule in Bowman,
supra, and went on to say:
Since smuggling by its very nature involves foreign countries, and since the accomplishment of the crime always requires some action in a foreign country, we have no
difficulty inferring that Congress did intend that the proyisions of 18 U.S.C. § 545
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hovering off the coast of the United States outside customs waters and
that unlawful introduction or removal into or from the United States
of merchandise or persons is likely to occur, the President 6 is empowered under the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act 7 to designate temporary extended customs enforcement zones out an additional 50 miles from the
12-mile boundary and laterally up to 100 miles in both directions. But
this authority has been used sparingly: the last such zone designated
was in 1935, and the statute has never been used to its fullest extent
against a ship of a foreign flag.
In view of this as well as intervening developments during the last
forty years, the question is presented as to the propriety, under principles of international law and obligations of international conventions
undertaken by the United States, of employing this act against narcotics smuggling by ships of foreign flags.
II.

HISTORY OF ANTI-HOVERING LEGISLATION

An assessment of the propriety of the proposed use of the 1935
Anti-Smuggling Act under international law must necessarily include a
discussion of the historical development of a state's competence to
enforce its laws in areas adjacent to its coast. In addition, past approaches and solutions to smuggling problems and improper uses of
contiguous high seas may prove instructive in avoiding pitfalls liable to
be encountered in an attack on narcotics smuggling. 8 For this purpose,
the high points of anti-smuggling legislation and attempts at extension
should extend to foreign countries at least as to citizens of the United States, and that 18
U.S.C. § 371, the conspiracy section, is extended along with it.
Id. at 350.
Therefore, even though there is no express declaration to the effect that 21 U.S.C. § 952(a)
and § 963 are within the Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction, it would lead to an absurd
result to conclude that Congress had not intended these sections to apply extraterritorially.
This principle dovetails with the proposition that no overt act is necessary within the
territorial limits of the judicial district where the defendants are being tried for conspiracy. It also
goes far in explaining why, in the absence of Congress' declaring a territorial limitation upon any
of the provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Act, possession of a controlled substance on
the high seas is not an offense, whereas conspiring to import the same substance is an offense:
Mere possession, being a status and a crime against one's person, would not be a crime beyond
the United States territorial limits without Congress' explicit mandate; whereas conspiring to
import the same substance, being a crime against the United States customs laws, would surely
be an offense on the high seas even without Congress' declaration, following the line of reasoning
in Brulay.
6. This authority was later delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury. Exec. Order No.
10,289, 3 C.F.R. 184 (1972), 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) (note). Since then, these functions of the
President under the 1935 Act have been transferred to the Secretary of Transportation. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1709 (1970).
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 70, 1401, 1432a, 1434, 1436, 1441, 1581, 1584-87, 1592, 1615, 1619, 1621,
1701, 1703-11 (1970).
8. An exhaustive treatment of this subject was prepared by Dr. H. E. Yntema, at that time
Professor of Law, University of Michigan, as an opinion on the validity of hovering legislation in
international law. It was submitted by the Treasury Department in support of H.R. 5496, which
upon enactment became the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act. It appears as a 42-page annex to the
record of hearings on H.R. 5496. Hearings on H.R. 5496 Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) [hereinafter cited as 1935 Hearings].
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of customs enforcement zones up to 1935 can be reconstructed. 9 The
following discussion draws heavily upon the history of and interaction
between British and American assertions of authority beyond the
territorial sea since documentation of areal assertions of these two
states is exceptionally complete and varied. Moreover, during the
relevant period (the 18th and 19th centuries), Great Britain was a
major world power providing influential leadership in the development
of the international law in this area.
British hovering acts' ° first appeared in the early 18th century
and limited the enforcement authority to visitation of ships within 2
leagues' I of the coast. As the smuggling trade grew and flourished over
the next 125 years, legislative enactments tried to keep pace in prescribing new enforcement measures as well as in extending limits: by
1807, all vessels which had been liable to forfeiture if hovering within
the four or eight league limits set by previous enactments applicable to
all vessels (the variation of limit depending upon the geographical
location along the English coastline), were now forfeitable within 100
leagues of the coast if so much as part ownership was held by British
12
subjects or one-half of the crew were British subjects.
The legality of this law was apparently not questioned until 1851,
when, upon asking the Queen's Advocate General for an opinion on
certain questions relative to the capture of a French vessel and her
crew, the Lords of the Treasury were given the reply that
[i]t is now generally understood and admitted that the territory of a country within which the rights of sovereignty may
be exercised extends to a distance of 3 miles from the shore
and that it would be an unwarranted assumption of power
against which other nations would have a right to remonstrate, if a government were to attempt to enforce its
13
municipal regulations beyond those limits.
9. Id. See also W. MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS (1929).

10. L.e., acts pertaining to "hovering vessels." Although the following definition is that used
in 19 U.S.C.A. § 1709(d) (1955) only for purposes of United States customs enforcement, the
words are descriptive of what has historically been meant by the term "hovering vessel":
any vessel which is found or kept off the coast of the United States within or without the
customs waters, if, from the history, conduct, character, or location of the vessel, it is
reasonable to believe that such vessel is being used or may be used to introduce or
promote or facilitate the introduction or attempted introduction of merchandise into the

United States in violation of the laws respecting the revenue.
11. One marine league equals approximately three nautical miles. A nautical mile is approximately 2000 yards.

12. An Act to Make More Effectual Provision for the Prevention of Smuggling, 47 Geo. 3
(2d Sess.), c. 66 (1807). One hundred league statutes superseded the four- to eight-league limits as
to British-connected vessels.
13. W. MASTERSON, supra note 9, at 127. The circumstances surrounding this statement
indicate that there had been no French protest; it was only an interdepartmental opinion which
apparently was not the consensus of other departments of the government. Id. at 129. Furthermore, Great Britain was at this time politically favoring the French, the smuggling trade had
declined to where it no longer posed a threat and the Advocate General (being an officer of the
Admiralty) likely was reflecting the Admiralty's position of desiring narrow territorial jurisdiction
on the seas. (One cannot help being reminded of the United States Defense Department's present
posture in this same regard relative to the Law of the Sea negotiations on territorial limits.)
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While the Advocate General's opinion subsequently provoked some
discussion at various levels of government concerning the desirability
of repealing the existing law, the propriety of the prescribed limits was
not seriously questioned for the next 25 years. 1 4 A new customs act
was finally passed in 187615 which drew back the jurisdictional limits
to one league with minor exceptions for a few specific infringements.
Great Britain apparently felt obligated by some principle of international law to draw back her jurisdictional limits; at least she later
depended upon it as an excuse for doing so. 16 This is illustrated by the
statement made in 1923 in negative response to a proposed treaty with
the United States allowing customs inspection out to 12 miles, that
"the ancient British Hovering Acts were modified in 1876 to bring
them into harmony with the principles of international law and His
Majesty's Government cannot admit that the municipal legislation of
17
any country can override these principles.'
In the United States, case law has consistently approved the right
of a coastal state to protect itself beyond the limits of its territorial sea.
Precedent is usually traced to the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in
Church v. Hubbart,18 concerning the seizure of an American vessel
five leagues off the Brazilian coast:
Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right [to
control colonial trade], is an injury to itself which it may
prevent, and it has a right to use the means necessary for its
prevention. These means do not appear to be limited within
any certain marked boundaries which remain the same at all
times and in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily
to vex and harrass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations
will resist their exercise. If they are such as reasonable and
necessary to secure their laws from violation, they will be
submitted to. 19
14. This is implied by the enactment in 1857 of a law extending and applying the various
one-, three-, four-, eight- and 100-league customs and hovering laws to those British possessions
abroad which had not legislated on the subject. An Act for the Alteration and Amendment of the
Laws and Duties of Customs, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 62, § 15 (1857).
15. An Act to Consolidate the Customs Laws, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 36 (1876).
16. At about this same time (1874-75), diplomatic correspondence was initiated between
Great Britain and the United States inquiring as to views about the Spanish claim of exercising
general maritime jurisdiction for a distance of two leagues from her coast. While Spain had
previously made the assertion without reservation, tracing its Spanish law origins to 1760, her
communication with the British acknowledged that for purposes of "military jurisdiction" three
miles was the rule, but in regard to "fiscal jurisdiction," Spain maintained that a state could set a
limit at whatever distance necessary to defend itself and to prevent the perpetration of revenue
fraud by smugglers. With their own customs hovering laws extending far beyond two leagues, the
British were not in a position to challenge the Spanish assertion of "fiscal jurisdiction" beyond one
league, nor were the Americans with their four-league customs enforcement laws. Thus, as late as
1875 it appears that no government had protested against the hovering laws of the United States,

Great Britain or Spain. W. MASTERSON, supra note 9, at 257-62.
17. W. MASTERSON, supra note 9, at 342, citing British Government Note of Sept. 17, 1923
(U.S. press release, Feb. 16, 1927).

18. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804).
19. Id.

at 235.
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Although the words were actually obiter dictum, they have been
consistently and frequently quoted as precedent for this principle.
Referring to British case law, in Queen v. Keyn 20 Lord Cockburn
quoted Chief Justice Marshall's statement approvingly and added:
Hitherto, legislation, so far as relates to foreigners in foreign
ships in this part of the sea, has been confined to the maintenance of neutral rights and obligations, the prevention of
breaches of the revenue and fishery laws, and, under particular circumstances, to cases of collision. In the two first the
legislation is altogether irrespective of the three-mile distance,
being found on a totally different principle, namely, the right
of a state to take all necessary measures for the protection of
its territory and rights,
and the prevention of any breach of
2
its revenue laws. '
There seems to have been but little protest of the United States'
exercise of customs jurisdiction out to a four-league zone 22 until the
probition era began. With the bulk of the rumrunners flying the
British flag, Great Britain bore the brunt of enforcement when in 1922
the United States began seizing British smuggling vessels beyond the
three-mile territorial sea. The strength of British protest and the unwillingness of the United States to back down from its position that
seizures of hovering vessels were not contrary to international law
induced the United States to propose a treaty arrangement. In anticipation of such negotiations, British vessels taken beyond three miles
from shore were released.
Keeping in mind the controversy surrounding a previous Russian
extension of jurisdiction, 23 the British were reluctant to enter a treaty
prescribing the same 12-mile jurisdiction limit. In fact, their objection
to such a treaty was not to the exercise of United States jurisdiction
against ships outside its three-mile territorial sea but to the specifica20. [1876] 2 Ex.D. 63.
21. Id. at 214.
22. The year 1790 marks the enactment of legislation specifying a four-league limit on
customs manifest examination and prohibition of unloading of any vessel bound for the United
States. An Act to Provide More Effectually for the Collection of Duties, ch. 35, § 11, 1 Stat. 145
(1790). Subsequent reenactments in one form or another are still applicable today without the
requirement that the vessel be bound for the United States. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1970)
(boarding vessels), § 1586 (unlawful unlading or transshipment), § 1709(c) (definition of "customs
waters'). In addition, in 1807, forfeiture was provided as the penalty for any ship found "in any
river . . . or on the high seas, within the jurisdiction limits of the United State", or hovering on

the coast thereof' having on board any negroes for the purpose of selling thern as slaves, or "with
intent to land the same." An Act to Prohibit the Importation of Slaves into ...
ch. 22, § 7, 2 Stat. 426 (1807).

the United States,

23. In 1910 and 1911 when, against the protests of Japan and Great Britain, Russia
extended its customs and fisheries jurisdiction to 12 miles (FOREIGN REL. U.S. 1289 (1912)),
subjecting "every vessel" to supervision, it relied on the United States customs jurisdiction of 12
miles and the French marine customs zone of 20 kilometers as precedent for its action, stating
that the limit to which customs supervision could be extended was not a question of international
usage but of domestic regulation. The bulk of the controversy concerning the Russian extension
centered around the fisheries issue, however, and by and large the extension of its revenue laws
jurisdiction came to be forgotten.

19751

1935 ANTI-SMUGGLING ACT

tion, in miles, of any distance other than that claimed by Britain
herself.2 4 Thus, to preserve the sanctity of the three-mile limit, the
treaty specified for smuggling activities a one-hour's sailing distance
measured either by the speed of the hovering ship or by the speed of
the boats making contact from the shore. Having made this agreement
with Great Britain, the United States negotiated with 15 other nations,
treaties similar in their limitation of jurisdiction to a one-hour's sailing
distance. 25 The treaties were essentially agreements that the foreign
flag states would pose no objection if one of their vessels engaged in
smuggling liquor into the United States was seized within one-hour's
sailing distance of the United States coast.
Even at this time, the charge of conspiracy was being used in an
attempt to plug loopholes in liquor smuggling enforcement. In Ford v.
United States (The Quadra),2 6 the British defendants were arrested for
conspiring to violate United States prohibition laws at a disputed
location.2 7 Concluding the contact boat capable of 6.6 knots unloaded, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court's finding that the
2 8
seizure had occurred within a one hour's sailing distance.
24. W. MASTERSON, supra note 9, at 333.
25. These treaties were interpreted to be self-executing to the extent that legislation was not
necessary to authorize executive action in pursuance of their provisions. With respect to treaty
vessels, the treaties took precedence over and superseded inconsistent legislation authorizing Coast
Guard boarding, searches and seizures within 12 miles of the coast. Still, they did nothing to
extend the limits of internal United States revenue law which remained under the 12-mile
restraint. In other words, for a treaty vessel to be liable for prosecution, the offense must be
committed not only within the one-hour's sailing distance set by the treaties, but also within the
12-mile customs enforcement zone.
26. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
27. I.e., either 5.7 or 13.6 nautical miles off the Farallon Islands near San Francisco. There
was also a dispute whether speed should be measured in a loaded or unloaded condition.
28. It was noted, however, that if the arrest had been made outside the enforcement
jurisdiction permitted by the liquor treaty, that reliance on Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)
(holding that a defendant could not challenge an indictment or conviction on the grounds that his
person had been improperly brpught before the court) would be improper since such an arrest
would violate a treaty of the United States, which the Court felt constitutionally bound to uphold
as the law of the land. But the Court stated that even if the arrest had taken place outside the
one-hour distance enforcement zone permitted under the treaty, the proper procedural vehicle
would have been a plea to the Court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendants prior to the
entry of a not-guilty plea. The failure to so plead amounted to a waiver of the jurisdictional
objection. The liquor treaty restrictions immediately, then, became a procedural device by which
foreign defendants arrested outside one-hour's sailing distance could successfully challenge the
court's jurisdiction even though a conspiracy were otherwise provable. In two cases shortly
following Ford, conspiracy charges were dismissed using this approach: United States v.
Schouweiler, 19 F.2d 387 (S.D. Cal. 1927) (a Panamanian-registered vessel 66 nautical miles from
the United States coast) and United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927) (a Britishowned vessel of Panamanian registry arrested 270 miles from the United States coast).
In 1933 the Supreme Court went one step further in Cook v. United States (The Mazel Toy),
288 U.S. 102 (1933), where a British-registered vessel capable of ten miles per hour was arrested
11
miles from the Massachusetts coast and charged with failure to include liquor in the
manifest. Although the defendant, as master of the vessel, excepted to the court's jurisdiction, he
answered to the merits of the case with the United States contending that his answer waived any
right to object to the enforcement of the penalties. In dismissing the libel against the vessel and its
cargo, the Supreme Court found that by entering into the treaty with Great Britain, the United
States had imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority which wholly took away its
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With the repeal of prohibition, it was anticipated that liquor
smuggling would cease. While it temporarily had this effect, the price
differential imposed by United States alcohol taxes ensured that
smuggling would remain a profitable business. By early 1934, alcohol
smuggling began expanding to the levels of the prohibition era and the
disability in the criminal statutes resulting from the failure of internal
law to provide for any arrest of a foreign flag vessel outside the 12-mile
limit 29 began to seem a serious weakness. Since the alcohol treaties were
not repealed when prohibition ended, the United States Treasury
Department sought to force more mileage out of them by closing this
gap of internal law which prevented applying those treaties outside the
12-mile customs zone. The 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act 30 was proposed
to effect this purpose, as well as to provide for designation of temporary customs enforcement zones against hovering vessels of non-treaty
nations beyond the 12-mile customs zone and to impose criminal
penalties on United States nationals violating customs laws of foreign
states if reciprocal legislation were in effect. Although carefully
worded to avoid conflict with the liquor treaties, the Act went beyond
power to seize. This was to be distinguished from such cases as where there was merely a lack of
authority on the part of the person wrongfully making the seizure or abduction, followed by a
forfeiture or conviction which would ratify the unauthorized act and render it completely
immaterial.
In support of the view that this particular jurisdictional defect could not be cured by an
answer to the merits on the part of the individual claimant, Professor Dickinson noted that
,[i]t is of course true that an individual defendant may waive an objection which he is
personally entitled to make to the jurisdiction of a particular court by appearing and
pleading to the merits. . . . But such a waiver of personal privilege cannot invest the
nation with a competence which it would not otherwise possess.
Dickinson, JurisdictionFollowing Seizure or Arrest in Violation of InternationalLaws, 28 AM. J.
INT'L L. 231, 236 n.13 (1934).
Thus the Mazel Toy established the exception to Ker that in those cases where the United
States had imposed upon itself certain territorial limitations of jurisdiction by means of a treaty,
the treaty would prevail over common law.
29. See note 25 supra.
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970). The most pertinent passage reads:
(a) Whenever the President finds and declares that at any place or within any area on
the high seas adjacent to but outside customs waters any vessel or vessels hover or are
being kept off the coast of the United States and that, by virtue of the presence of any
such vessel or vessels at such place or within such area, the unlawful introduction or
removal into or from the United States of any merchandise or person is being or may be
occasioned, promoted, or threatened, the place or area so found and declared shall
constitute a customs-enforcement area for the purposes of this chapter. Only such
waters on the high seas shall be within a customs-enforcement area as the President
finds and declares are in such proximity to such vessel or vessels that such unlawful
introduction or removal of merchandise or persons may be carried on by or to or from
such vessel or vessels. No customs-enforcement area shall include any waters more than
one hundred nautical miles from the place or immediate area where the President
declares such vessel or vessels are hovering or are being kept and, notwithstanding the
foregoing provision, shall not include any waters more than fifty nautical miles outwards from the outer limit of customs waters. Whenever the President finds that, within
any customs-enforcement area, the circumstances no longer exist which gave rise to the
declaration of such area as a customs-enforcement area, he shall so declare, and
thereafter, and until a further finding and declaration is made under this subsection
with respect to waters within such area, no waters within such area shall constitute a
part of such customs-enforcement area. The provisions of law applying to the high seas
adjacent to customs waters of the United States shall be enforced in a customsenforcement area upon any vessel, merchandise, or person found therein.
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them in that the proposed special customs enforcement zones could be
designated for non-liquor smuggling activities.
Even before its passage, the 1935 Act encountered diplomatic
protest by Great Britain 3' which refused to recognize any interference
outside the 12-mile zone with respect to ships not covered under the
liquor treaty. There does not, however, appear to have been any
protest after adoption of the Act, but as Whiteman notes, this is "a
circumstance which is not in itself decisive seeing that, for the purposes of safeguarding rights, a protest is essential at the time of the
'' 32
application of the enactment as distinguished from its adoption.
The major item of discussion at the hearings3 3 was the propriety
of such legislation under international law, to which Professor Yntema's
memorandum opinion 34 lent support. 35 Professor Yntema intimated that
events have shown existing law to be inadequate and that the proposed
Anti-Smuggling Act was reasonable to prevent a breach of the revenue
laws. The issue of reasonableness was stressed in House Report 868 on
the bill, where it was declared that the legislation "is predicated upon the
rule of international law stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Church v.
Hubbart that a nation may exercise jurisdiction such distance beyond the
three-mile limit as may be reasonable and necessary to secure its revenue
or for national protection." And explaining section One of the bill:
[S]ince the bill makes applicable in such areas only a limited
number of laws and since only such of those laws may be
enforced in such areas upon such vessels as the President
finds and declares to be necessary to secure the revenue of the
United States . . . it is evident that the extension of our
customs control provided in § 1 meets
the test of reasonableness
36
required under international law.
31. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 490-92 (1965).
32. Id. at 505.

33. 1935 Hearings, supra note 8.
34. See note 8 supra.
35. In his conclusions, Yntema states:
10. That all reputable English and American text writers upon international law, with
one exception, namely, Dana, who, upon misconceived grounds, admits but deplores
the historic practice, recognize the principle involved in hovering legislation, either as
establishing a special right to take preventative measures in the interest of the revenue
to be exercised within reasonable limits, or as providing a privilege so to do, against the
reasonable exercise of which other nations do not protest, on the ground that a state is in
comity bound not to protect its subjects who violate the just and necessary revenue laws
of other nations, and that, on either view, there can be no question as to the right of a
state to enact appropriate hovering legislation. In view of this evidence, it is difficult, so
far as international practice and precedent is concerned, to conceive how the principle
involved in hovering legislation could be more satisfactorily proved ...
In any view, then, the fundamental principle expressed in hovering legislation does
not appear open to question. There being, consequently, no sustainable issue, from the
viewpoint of international law, as to the right of the United States to enact legislation of this
character or as to the propriety of its extension to the residual category of nontreaty vessels,
the real issue, if there be such, is as to the reasonableness and necessity of the several
provisions of the proposed legislation. This is a legislative question, the solution of which,
in our system of laws, is vested in Congress, and is beyond the scope of this memorandum.
1935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 122-23.
36. H.R. REP. No. 868, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1935). Testimony at the hearings
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Although the State Department refrained from voicing a public opinion
and merely advised the Treasury Department that it would not oppose
the enactment of the bill, this was interpreted by a member of Congress
and observers not only to signify a desire to remain uninvolved but also as
37
an indication that it had some reservations about the bill.
Five customs enforcement zones were designated shortly after the
38
passage of the Act in 1935, but none has been designated since. Of
the 16 vessels seized pursuant to these early designations, 11 were of
American registry and therefore did not raise any international law
issues. Of the remaining five foreign vessels, two were seized while in
a United States port, two within the 12-mile customs zone and the last,
although of British registry and seized between 15 and 36 miles from
the coast, was forfeited as a vessel substantially owned and controlled
by a United States citizen within the meaning of section 3(b) of the
Act. 39 With Britain's own customs laws extending discriminatorily
beyond the three-mile limit for vessels partially owned by British
subjects, the failure to register a protest to this seizure and forfeiture
was understandable. Thus the full panoply of provisions of the 1935
Anti-Smuggling Act has never been exercised nor its acceptability
tested by the international community so that the absence of protest by
foreign governments may be attributed primarily to a lack of enforcement by the United States in a manner potentially contrary to international law. Because of the innovative approach utilized in the 1935
Act, the traditional primary sources of international law (treaty, custom and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations) have
not been particularly helpful as touchstones to gauge its international
acceptance except in relation to later provisions in the 1958 Law of the
Sea Conventions. The lack of potentially controversial use of the Act
has prevented even the development of any case law as a subsidiary
source of international law. This leaves the teachings and commentary
reinforces the fact that the Treasury Department was concerned about meeting the reasonableness test. Mr. Hester, the attorney for the Treasury Department observed:
There is another angle that enters into this that might support the vesting of this
authority in the President, and that is that foreign nations might be less liable to object
if this authority is vested in the head of the Government . . . . We are trying in this
statute to meet the test of reasonableness required under international law. That is one
of the reasons why our customs control is extended only to particular areas where the
smugglers are actually present. We think it will be so much easier to meet the test of
reasonableness of international law if it is done that way.
1935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 81.
37. Jessup, The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 101-02 (1937).
38. Noting the provision of 19 U.S.C. § 1701 that
[w]henever the President finds that, within any customs-enforcement area, the circumstances no longer exist which gave rise to the declaration of such area as a
customs-enforcement area, he shall so declare, and thereafter, and until a further
finding and declaration is made under this subsection with respect to waters within such
area, no waters within such area shall constitute a part of such customs-enforcement
area,

there appears to be no record of a declaration of cancellation of any of these five designated zones
which raises the possibility, at least in theory, that they may be still in effect.
39. H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 375 (2d ed. 1952).
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of qualified international law publicists as the most persuasive standard against which to gauge the Act.

III.

POST 1935 CONTIGUOUS ZONE COMMENTARY AND
REACTIONS TO THE

A.

ACT

General Commentary

Referring in 1937 to writings of publicists following the 1935
enactment, Philip C. Jessup (later to become a justice on the International Court of Justice) voiced his opinion. In reference to the reliance
by Professor Yntema and the Treasury Department on the test of
reasonableness, he stated, "It is believed that this is a sound position
under international law. We then have a mixed question of fact and
law as to whether enforcement of this Act will meet the test of
reasonableness." '40 In 1939, Professor H. W. Briggs analyzed the seizures made under the 1935 Act and also favored its propriety under
international law. 4 1 This was countered shortly thereafter by an Associate of the Institut de Droit International, T. Baty, who remarked:
What is alarming is that so very learned and open-minded a
jurist as Professor Briggs should come forward to justify its
unrestricted operation. He is prepared to allow drastic interference on the part of the United States with foreign vessels,
bound for foreign ports, for nearly one hundred miles from
the American shore and his only restriction is, that interference must be reasonable."
This is no restriction at all against a powerful state: a
always uphold its interferences as
powerful state will
"reasonable" ones. 4 2
Baty's arguments rested on the concept of freedom of the seas which
could not be "whittled away by a few obscure instances," and on the
"permissive" theory that past interferences had been tolerated out of
friendliness without any admission of legality.
Later, in 1953, Professor P. M. Brown, in discussing together the
1935 Anti-Smuggling Act, the Truman Proclamation and the Submerged Lands Act, condemned American legal authorities and courts
who have "timidly and illogically accepted the outmoded interpretation
of doctrine of three-mile limit" which, he asserted, was not a delimitation of jurisdiction but simply the enunciation of the sound principle of
protective jurisdiction which is now firmly established in international
43
law.
40. Jessup, supra note 37, at 105.
41. Briggs, Les Etats-Unis et la Loi de 1935 sur la Contrebande, 20 REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL

ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAR]9E, 217-255 (no. 2,

1939).

42. Baty, The Free Sea-Produce the Evidence!, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1941).

43. Brown, Protective Jurisdiction over Marginal Waters, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 452, 453
(1953).
Earlier (in 1940), Professor P. M. Brown had discussed the Declaration of Panama whereby
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Professor H. A. Smith, a British authority, expressed a similar
view on contiguous zones in 1950:
The basic principle upon which the right to exercise jurisdiction outside territorial waters rests is that of self-defense ....
Up to a reasonable distance outside territorial waters, such
distance to be defined and notified, every state may exercise
such jurisdiction as may be necessary to protect the security
and internal order of the state over foreign vessels approaching the shore for illegal purposes. 44
During this time period, from the late 1920's to 1950's there were
attempts made by the international community to codify various parts
of international law pertaining to the seas. While a consensus of the states
favored a contiguous zone in one form or another, an agreement on the
various drafts (which ranged from an open-ended right based on custom
or necessity to a maximum of 12 miles) was not obtained. In addition to
the disagreement concerning the width of such a zone, a consensus could
not be obtained concerning the content of the zone, especially security
and fishing rights.
It was not until the four Conventions on the Law of the Sea4 s in
1958 that some agreement was obtained in this area. Nevertheless, the
Conventions were relatively unsuccessful in resolving many disputed
issues. Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas states that:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign
merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding her
unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its
21 American republics declared a security zone designed to protect inter-American communications. Defined by latitude and longitude coordinates, it extended up to 300 miles from the coasts.
He believed such action to be justified under the principle of protective jurisdiction and cited for
support the liquor treaties of the prohibition era, where, in spite of Britain's unwillingness to
recognize a United States contiguous zone, her signing of a one-hour sailing distance treaty
amounted to a recognition of the basic sovereign right of every nation to protect itself over an
indefinable zone outside conventional territorial waters. Brown, Protective Jurisdiction, 34 AM.
J. INT'L L. 112 (1940). (The State Department justified the Declaration as "a practical measure
designed to maintain certain vital interests," and a "statement of principle, based on the inherent
right of self-protection rather than a formal proposal for the modification of international law.")
7 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW 703-04 (1943).
44. H. SMITH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 21, 22 (2d ed. 1950).
45. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311;
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. These four United Nations Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea represent an attempt by the international community to come
to some agreement regarding use of the oceans.
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flag, the 4 6ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship.
Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone provides, on the other hand:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea,
the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
47
sea is measured.
Because of the wording of the conventions and their subsequent interpretation, only the High Seas Convention is considered as a codification of pre-existing international law; the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone is not. In 1959 Professor Jessup
commented on the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone:
The present writer believes that Mr. [Arthur] Dean (Chairman of the United States delegation to the Geneva Conference) is quite right in saying that the Conference did not, and
indeed it could not, change an existing rule of international
law, certainly not by majority vote ....
[I]t remains true that
"validity of the delimitation (of territorial sea) with regard to
other States depends upon international law." (Quoting from
the Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951) I.C.J. Rep. 116,
132.)48

In another article, Arthur Dean commented:
The United States would have preferred a stronger provision
giving the coastal State the power to punish activities within
the contiguous zone which had deleterious effects in the territory or territorial sea, even though the offending vessel had
never entered the territorial sea. But the present provision is
a step forward. By adopting it, the Geneva Conference succeeded where prior conference had failed. It may be hoped
that practice under the present provision will encourage the
adoption of a stronger provision at a later time. 4 9
46. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 at
92.
47. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, T.I.A.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 at 220.
48. Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 234,
246 (1959).

49. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was Accomplished, 52 AM.
J. INT'L L. 607, 624 (1958).
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One outright critic of contiguous zones, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
(Britain's representative on the I.L.C. to the 1958 Convention), interprets Article 24, § 1(a) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zones as merely authorizing preventative measures rather
than actual arrests: "The basic object is anticipatory. No offence
against the laws of the coastal State is actually being committed at the
time." 50 Conversely, Article 24, § 1(b) (punishment) can only be
applied to outgoing vessels which already have committed offenses
within the territorial sea, according to Fitzmaurice. 5 1 This literal
interpretation does not comport with the previous practice of states
both in prescribing and in applying certain laws in their contiguous
zones and it is doubtful whether Article 24 has changed that practice.
Moreover, there seems to be little support for Fitzmaurice's point of
view, and Professor Shigeru Oda of Japan has specifically published
52
his non-subscribance to it.
Despite Article 24's non-recognition of a fisheries zone, the United
States in 1966 extended its fisheries jurisdiction out to 12 miles, blessed
with the State Department's affirmation that, in view of recent developments in international practice, the extension would not be contrary to
international law. Security, fisheries and the manner of enforcing laws and
punishing offenses in the contiguous zone provide three examples of
situations where states are not presently adhering to the literal interpretation of Article 24, due in part to the international community's expectation
that no one would be bound in that manner.
B.

The Opinions of McDougal and Burke

During the late 1950's, Professors McDougal and Burke published several articles applying to the developing law of the sea the
Lasswell-McDougal technique of analyzing the interaction of various
sociological processes occurring in the international world arena in an
effort to explain and predict more successfully outcomes of international disputes. These articles, plus their culmination in book form
(The Public Order of the Oceans, 1962), offer an alternative approach
to predicting the degree of authority which a coastal state might
properly apply in areas contiguous to its coast.
Stepping back and taking an overview of the entire problem, one
might ask what international community policy governs the establish50. Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8 INT'L &

COMP. L.Q. 73, 114 (1959).
51. Fitzmaurice also agrees with the exclusion of fisheries from the contiguous zone on the
bases that: 1) existing contiguous zone rights do not act to exclude vessels from the zone, whereas
a fisheries zone would; 2) existing contiguous zone rights do not involve a proprietary element,
whereas a fisheries zone would; and 3) existing contiguous zone rights involve the protection of
public laws and interests, whereas a fisheries zone would protect only private interests of
fishermen. Id. at 119-20.
52. Oda, The Concept of the Contiguous Zone, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 131 (1962).
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ment of a contiguous zone? A sensible explanation advanced by
McDougal and Burke is that
[t]he real function of the contiguous zone concept has been to
serve as a safety valve from the rigidities of the territorial
sea, permitting the satisfaction of particular reasonable demands through exercise of limited authority which5 3does not
endanger the whole gamut of community interests.
Professor Jessup likewise concluded that it would be impractical
to attempt to establish a precise limit of so many miles for a contiguous
zone and that some flexibility was necessary. 5 4 Professor P. M. Brown
believed any definition in terms of miles would be futile and illogical,"5
while the Harvard Research committee, 5 6 which formulated one of the
drafts for the 1930 Hague Conference stated that "[t]he distance from
shore at which these powers may be exercised is determined not by
mileage but by the necessity of the littoral state and by the connection
between the interests of its territory and the acts performed on the high
sea." 5 7 Few commentators have expressed any satisfaction with the
inflexible 12-mile limit as defined in Article 24. Thus, in the face of the
flexible distances to which states have projected their contiguous zone
regulations, McDougal and Burke dismiss the International Law Commission's recommendation of a single 12-mile zone as anachronistic. In
attacking this section they suggest that it
could scarcely confound confusion more. Reference is made
to one contiguous zone, not to the many actually existing in
practice, and that one zone is limited to 12 miles, without
regard to differences in factors affecting the multiple demands of coastal states. Perhaps the most explicit evidence of
the Commission's narrow view lies in the restricted range of
interests which it suggests a state ought to be authorized to
protect in contiguous areas: "customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations." The most surprising of the omissions, one explicitly
mentioned in the commentary as deliberate, is that of security, surely the most serious concern of every state.5 8
53. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 76 (1962).
54. P. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 460
(1972).
55. Brown, Protective Jurisdiction, 34 Am. J. INT'L L. 112, 114 (1940).

56. In response to a resolution adopted by the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations on
September 27, 1927, that questions of nationality, territorial waters and responsibility of states
should be examined with a view towards codification in international law, Harvard Law School

organized an Advisory Committee of 44 scholars and jurists to direct the research in international
law and to prepare draft articles on numerous areas of international law.
57. Comment to Draft of Convention on Territorial Waters, Art. 20, 23 AM. J. INT'L L.,
Spec. Supp. 334 (1929).
58. McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the Sea, 67 YALE L.J. 539, 582 (1958).

Among comments accompanying the International Law Commission's (I.L.C.) Draft Article
(upon which Article 24 was based) are the following:
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Believing that the concept of the contiguous zone offers the most
economic method of accommodating a state's exclusive security interest with the more general inclusive interests of other states,
McDougal and Burke go on to state:
For this reason, continued recognition of a special competence in each state to declare reasonable contiguous zones
would appear merely as another expression of broad community interest. And what is so demonstrably economic, in
the area of security, could by appropriate detail be shown to
be similarly economic, 5if9 in varying measure, in regard to
other problems as well.
Thus, McDougal and Burke predict that states accepting the Geneva
Convention will not feel obligated to repeal such legislation as contiguous customs enforcement or in the case of the United States, the
Anti-Smuggling Act. According to this view, it is more realistic to
expect the continued prescription and active enforcement of policies to
be observed in contiguous zones to secure the reasonable protection of
important interests, without regard to the literal wording of Article 24:
From the perspectives of general community policy, there
would appear to be nothing inimical in states continuing to
act, as in the past, to secure their legitimate interests by
exercise of6 0a reasonable authority to apply policy in contiguous areas.
Nevertheless, since 1962, following United States ratification of Article
24 and its coming into force, the question has been raised whether
contrary internal laws would remain valid. Although there appears to
have been no authoritative decision as to the self-executing effect of
Article 24, few have contended seriously that it has repealed contrary
internal legislation.
IV.

SMUGGLING PROBLEMS UNDER THE

LASSWELL-MCDOUGAL ANALYSIS
At the beginning of this paper it was noted that analysis of
approaches and solutions to past smuggling problems and to improper
uses of contiguous high seas would illuminate any approach taken to
narcotics smuggling. An attempt will be made to analyze three smuggling problems: importation of slaves; alcohol smuggling (both during
and after prohibition); and narcotics smuggling under the Lasswell[In regard to security] It (the I.L.C.) considered that the extreme vagueness of the term
"security" would open the way for abuses and that the granting of such rights was not
necessary. The enforcement of customs and sanitary regulations will be sufficient in
most cases to safeguard the security of the state. [The comment referenced international

law and the United Nations charter in cases of self defense for security.]
[In regard to fisheries] Nor was the commission willing to recognize any exclusive right
of the coastal state to engage in fishing in the contiguous zone.

[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 294-95, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/101 (1956).
59. McDougal & Burke, supra note 58, at 584.
60. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 53, at 630.
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McDougal approach. The employment of this analysis, which is necessarily somewhat superficial here, is useful primarily in determining
which law prescription and enforcement measures might meet the test
of reasonableness. Since the establishment of a contiguous zone involves by definition the assertion of a claim by a coastal state which is
likely to be followed by acquiescence or rejection by the world community, the whole process is particularly well-suited to this system of
examination.
As a starting point, McDougal and Burke's analysis requires an
understanding of three different processes: the process of interaction,
which serves to develop the factual background significant for the
policy of enjoyment of the oceans; the process of claim, which identifies the two sets of competing interests which states assert to inclusive
and exclusive uses; and the process of authoritative
decision, whereby
61
interests are honored, protected or rejected.
The earlier part of this paper reviewed much of the historical
background of hovering statutes, extensions of limited jurisdiction
offshore and states' interactions in that regard. Suffice it here to say
that, traditionally, when the territorial interest of a state has been
threatened by an element from the sea, the coastal state has felt
justified in asserting its laws and enforcement procedures seaward a
distance sufficient to subdue that element and that in the main and
where the coastal state's claim is not manifestly unreasonable, this has
been acquiesced in by other states in the international community,
whether simply by non-protest or by the conclusion of treaties authorizing such extensions of limited jurisdiction. Thus it was the rise
and continuance of smuggling that caused Great Britain to extend its
customs jurisdiction in leapfrog fashion out to sea; it was only after
the smuggling problem had declined that the Queen's Advocate General in 1851 rendered his opinion that it was an "unwarranted assumption of power" to extend Britain's jurisdiction beyond the three-mile
limit, and it was not until 1876, when organized smuggling was all but
eradicated, that Parliament retracted the customs jurisdiction over
foreign vessels to one league, a principle to which she held so tenaciously thereafter, as representing the proper statement of international
law. Similarly, it was not prohibition itself which led to the conclusion
of liquor treaties, but rather the gathering of hordes of rumrunners off
the coast and the concomitant recognition by the concluding nations
that the United States had a right to protect itself from an instrumentality which had the potential to land contraband cargo within the
span of one hour. 62 And it was the unexpected continuance of liquor
61. Id. at 13, 14.
62. In the proper perspective, it should be noted that the treaties had the element of a

bargain contained in them in that, with respect to the treaty nations, the United States made the
concession of permitting foreign vessels containing liquor cargo bound for non-United States ports
or sea stores liquor to enter the waters and ports of the United States as long as the alcohol
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smuggling after prohibition ceased which led to the enactment of the
1935 Anti-Smuggling Act. While that Act remains latent on the books
but ready for application should the need arise, it is apparently the
decline in organized smuggling by means of hovering vessels which has
led to its disuse since 1935. On the issue of the United States' willingness to recognize another state's right to pass similar legislation, one
has only to turn to the words of the Act and the Congressional
hearings. One of the Act's provisions, § 2(a) (now 18 U.S.C. § 546),
provided for the prosecution of United States citizens engaged in
smuggling activities against the laws of a foreign government if under
that foreign government's laws penalty or forfeiture was provided for
the violation of United States customs laws. This was included expressly with the hope that it would encourage other states to enact
similar reciprocating legislation.
The objectives of the coastal state in enacting provisions for
limited jurisdiction in contiguous zones should be identified. Although
the following does not conform exactly with the McDougal terminology, it is flexible in order to accommodate terms which are more
descriptive of these objectives. Referring to the first of the three smuggling situations, the 1807 statute prescribing forfeiture of any vessel
hovering on the coast with the intent to introduce slaves into United
States territory apparently was rooted in the moral ethic mandating
that human beings not be placed unwillingly in subjugation, despite
the rather widespread practical acceptance of slavery at that time.
The evil sought to be corrected was as pernicious on board the vessel
itself (perhaps more so) than that awaiting the slaves on debarkation.
This justified a high degree of exclusive interference into the inclusive
free use of the sea. Moreover, the statute was justifiable on economic
grounds: given a policy of discouraging the practice of slavery, it
would be more efficient and less expensive to attack the slave trade
prior to its introduction into the country, before the "cargo" had been
dispersed and "property rights" had become vested in buyers. As
interaction among civilized countries developed in regard to this problem and anti-slavery principles began to be accepted in the international community, the recognition of a right to interfere with the slave
trade became so universal that it was recognized, first in numerous
early treaties and later in the Convention on the High Seas, as an act
which might be interfered with by any warship anywhere on the high
seas. The inclusive right of freedom of the seas had to give way to the
exclusive right of any state to free enslaved human beings.
An analysis of the smuggling acts of Great Britain during the 18th
and 19th centuries, when the range of goods being smuggled varied
widely and reflected changing tastes over a long time period, reveals
remained under seal. This enabled treaty states to get around the unpopular decision of Cunard
S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923), holding to the contrary, which had become a source of
irritation to foreign governments.
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the primary objective as an economic one-to protect the customs
revenues of the Crown. The extensions out to 100 leagues, thus
grounded essentially in little more than economic arguments, met with
the acquiescence of the world community.
It is profitable to consider the United States' experience with
alcohol smuggling from a dual perspective-both during and after
prohibition. The Volstead Amendment imposing prohibition was
brought about by moral sentiment condemning the evils of spiritous
drink. The objectives in attacking liquor smuggling, then, were
primarily the protection of the country's morals and to a lesser degree
the economic efficiency of attacking the problem at its source. But
since the moral evil was consumed after its entry and did not linger
afterward, as did slavery, to plague the country, the primary concern
was preventing its introduction in the first place. Moreover, unlike
slavery, which, even in the early 19th century, was condemned by
most civilized countries, there was little international sentiment favoring the United States' experiment with prohibition. Foreign states were
understandably incensed by the United States' effort to prohibit
foreign nationals from engaging in the sale of liquor beyond the 3-mile
or 12-mile limit since, from the viewpoint of foreign states, this was
entirely legitimate commerce; extended interference thus constituted a
serious infringement of their rights to engage in commerce upon the
high seas. It is surprising, then, that the United States obtained as
much agreement as it did in completing 16 liquor treaties permitting
enforcement within one-hour's sailing distance. The willingness of the
United States, as noted earlier, to reciprocate by reversing the effect of
Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon 63 may have been effective persuasion to
these foreign states.
In 1933, however, repeal of prohibition changed the complexion
of the United States' enforcement objectives. While it was no longer
considered morally objectionable to introduce liquor into United States
territory, failure to pay the alcohol tax and customs duties still rendered it illegal. During the hearings on the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act,
movements of known alcohol smugglers during the latter one-third of
1934 were extrapolated to show an annual revenue loss of $30 million. 6 4 The emphasis in objectives was correspondingly shifted from
moral to economic.
The objectives of attacks on drug smuggling are primarily
grounded in health and moral considerations, but also in the economic
efficiency of attacking the problem before the contraband enters
United States territory, becoming more expensive and difficult to deal
with. While this sounds similar to the objectives in attacking alcohol
smuggling during prohibition, a key difference lies in the increased
seriousness of the perceived hazards in health and morals, as well as in
63. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
64. 1935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 2.
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the existence of almost universal support in the international community for the suppression of narcotics traffic. While in this respect it is
similar to its counterpart in slavery traffic, the urgency of attack is less
demanding, since the presence of a narcotics laden ship on the high
seas, until it comes into port, does not present the same human threat
as does a slave galley operating anywhere.
Turning to the claims process, the two competing interests asserted by states in claiming inclusive and exclusive authority must be
considered and the important conditions identified which must continue to affect the claims. The claims process by which states seek
their objectives is related to the degree of inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the use demanded, the degree of comprehensiveness of authority asserted, and the geographic area in which such use and authority
are demanded. For each of these claims, there exists a counterclaim,
generally freedom from the claimant's authority and competence of the
state to exercise its own authority to protect its own use, both subsumed under the term freedom of the seas. 65 For this reason, the
various British smuggling acts were limited by reference to types of
activities or ships which fell under their extended provisions, e.g.,
certain dutiable commodities, ships hovering or ships of a certain
construction. The initial United States slavery statute was limited to
ships carrying slaves with the intent to land them, the counterclaim
being that of states wishing to engage in the slave trade, which
declined in strength as the anti-slavery movement was recognized
worldwide. To achieve uniformity in enforcement the liquor treaties
specified as targets ships suspected to be endeavoring to commit an
offense and expressed the distance in functional terms of the offending
ships' ability to escape. The use of treaties as vehicles provided greater
uniformity and ensured a clear understanding of the rights and obligations of both parties to prevent misapplication to other inclusive uses.
The 1935 Act, in an abundance of caution to avoid any interference with legitimate freedoms on the high seas, limits the areal extent
as well as the temporal duration of zones, besides requiring the presence of a hovering vessel believed to be engaged in or liable to be
engaged in smuggling activities as the necessary evidence before the
President shall designate a customs enforcement zone outside the normal 12-mile contiguous zone. Nevertheless, even when applied against
the offenders or potential offenders that it was designed to deal with
(i.e., ships carrying liquor), it may, in the eyes of many states in the
international community, constitute a serious infringement on the inclusive use that those states would claim: that of transporting and
selling alcoholic beverages on the high seas. When specifically applied
to the narcotics trade, however, one reasonably anticipates nearly
universal agreement among states that such an inclusive use as trans65. M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 53, at 29.
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porting narcotics on the high seas for potential sale demands far less
protection vis-a-vis a coastal state's right to prevent a landing on its
shores. Thus any counterclaim against such use must lack strength in
its assertion and should not be asserted to the fringes of the high seas.
Lastly, considering the process of authoritative decision-making,
the international community has sought to establish certain objectives
which, in terms of decreasing levels of abstraction, may be variously
expressed as: the promotion of full, peaceful use of the ocean by all
participants; or the securing of common interests of all participants in
both inclusive and exclusive uses, maintaining a balance between
different common interests; or the promotion of stability in expectations of participants that power will be exercised uniformly and not
arbitrarily. 66 It follows that to maintain a common policy regarding
protection of inclusive interests, the general community consensus of
what that policy should be must be maintained, and it becomes essential that states recognize their community of interests. To identify
what, if any, community interest exists in attacks on smuggling, one
must identify the evil being attacked. Community interest in regard to
the transportation and sale of liquor on the high seas would tend far
more to favor inclusive uses and freedom of the seas than would be
likely in the case of narcotics smuggling, where community interest,
given nearly universal condemnation of the use of narcotics, would
tolerate a much greater exercise of exclusive competence by the coastal
state to exclude the smuggling from its shores. And as observed earlier
in regard to the interaction among the British, Americans, and
Spanish, up to 1875 there appeared to be broad recognition of international community interests in honoring and upholding customs enforcement far beyond the territorial sea, even when its roots were
purely fiscal or economic, falling far short of the level of a universal moral
harzard.
The import of this brief analysis is that only by looking at a
particular context of conflicting exclusive and inclusive uses can one
determine what is reasonable in terms of the assertion of an exclusive
use and competence. The analysis seems to favor applying the 1935
Anti-Smuggling Act against hovering vessels engaged in narcotics
smuggling, but due to events subsequent to its passage, the analysis
cannot be applied in a vacuum. There are certain impediments to the
Act's application, primarily in the provisions of Article 24 of the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, as well as in
possible misinterpretations by other states of the United States' behavior
if the Act were to be applied.
Another example of the McDougal and Burke analysis, which
may be applied by analogy to the potential problems involving the use
of the 1935 Act to resolve difficulties of enforcement of narcotics
66. Id.

at 37.
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smuggling laws, is their consideration of marine oil pollution. The
conclusion of the analysis was that general community policy would
probably tolerate a coastal state's requirement that ships install any
effective and available equipment to reduce or eliminate effects of
pollution discharge. 67 Yet, when Canada passed the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act, 68 which imposed certain safety and construction standards on any ship coming within 100 miles of the Arctic
coast, the United States State Department protested vehemently that
international law did not recognize such a unilateral extension of
jurisdiction, that it might lead other countries to make other invalid
claims, and that it adversely affected not only the right of freedom of
the seas but the effort to reach international agreement on the use of
the seas. Although the Canadian Act is distinguishable from the 1935
Act in its application to all ships and in the permanence of its zone,
this reaction shows a definite preference, at least on the part of the
United States Department of State, to establish such zones under
international agreement rather than by unilateral action, even though
the United States shares a concern for the prevention of Arctic pollu69
tion.
With regard to the United States' fear that using the 1935 Act may
lead to other states passing similar valid or invalid legislation, the 1935
Act was passed, as noted earlier, with the hope and expectation that
other countries would, in fact, reciprocate, at least as to certain portions of the act. During the ensuing 40 years, however, the complexion
of international politics may have changed sufficiently that this is no
longer a declared United States objective. If the Act were used sparingly and only with sufficient reasonable cause to believe that narcotics
smuggling was actually being engaged in, it seems doubtful that temporary assertions of competence would lead to invalid extensions of
competence by other states. In regard to the general inhibiting effect of
the existence of Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone, the authorities cited earlier, pointing out its weaknesses in terms of flexibility and failure to provide for such contiguous
coastal interests as security and fishing rights, 70 seem to feel that it has
no substantial effect on established state practices. Nevertheless, many
signers of the Convention would not so interpret Article 24 and furthermore would believe it an act of inconsistency on the part of the
United States on the one hand to protest Canada's Arctic pollution
control statute and on the other to try to justify a temporary customs
67..Id. at 849.
68. CAN. REv. STAT. c.2 (Ist Supp.) (1970).
69. See, e.g., provisions in the United States' draft articles for a 200-mile economic resource
zone (Doc. No. A/CONF. 62/C.2/L. 47 of 8 August 1974), 3d U.N. Conf. on Law of the Sea, 3
Off Records 222 (1975), which were presented as a basis for negotiation at the Third Law of the
Sea Conference held at Geneva, March 17 to May 9, 1975. This point is best illustrated by article
16, id. at 223.
70. See Part I1 supra.
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enforcement zone up to 62 miles seaward. Given the United States'
adherence to Article 24, it is at least questionable whether the international world community would acquiesce in such an enforcement zone.
Even assuming that the United States would want to adhere
strictly to the commitment it signed under Article 24, the question
arises whether it would be bound by that Article vis-a-vis a state
which had not signed the convention. In view of the principles set
forth by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 71 where it was held in delimiting the continental shelf
median line between Denmark, Holland, and Germany, that the
method of boundary delimitation prescribed by the convention would
not be applicable since Germany was not a signatory of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, one is led to conclude that the United
States would not be bound as against nonsignatories. In dealing with
the argument that such a principle had become part of customary
international law and that Germany should be bound, the court found
that the practice of boundary delimitation emanated from the conviction that it was rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it; custom would have been found to exist only if the principle amounted to a settled practice. Considering the various disagreements among states concerning the width of their territorial sea (which
in many cases extends beyond the 12-mile contiguous zone permitted
by Article 24), the width of the contiguous zone and assertions of other
contiguous claims not recognized by Article 24, such as security,
fishing rights, etc., by both signatory and nonsignatory states, it seems
doubtful that the principles of Article 24 have fallen into the domain of
customary international law. Thus, by virtue of the principle of
reciprocity, the United States should not feel bound by Article 24 as
against a nonsignatory state to the Convention who is not bound by
it.
Moreover, the United States arguably could declare its adherence
to Article 24 and still find support for applying the Act. Under the
principle that a treaty should be interpreted, if at all possible, not to
conflict with a statute, it is reasonable to interpret Article 24 as
contemplating only continuous, permanent contiguous zones and not
the temporary exertions of jurisdiction under the 1935 Act requiring a
heavy burden of proof of potential smuggling activities. These may be
considered as completely outside the realm contemplated by Article 24,
which was not aimed at such simple short-term restrictions on inclusive uses.
. The more international cooperation and agreement existing on the
subject, the greater the likelihood of international acceptance. The
success of the reciprocity provisions of the Act which encouraged other
states to pass similar legislation might serve as a barometer measuring
71. [1969] I.C.J. 4.
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the international community's tolerance and acceptance of such legislation.
Consideration should be given particularly to the states against
which this act would most likely be applied. While the majority of
foreign flag narcotics smuggling has so far involved Jamaican or Colombian vessels, nationals of any number of other Latin and South
American states may likely act as links in the "Latin-American Connection." Due to the large number of Latin and South American states
sympathetic to or claiming a 200-mile territorial sea, reciprocity principles would prevent their asserting a violation of international law
against the United States. However, keeping in mind the United
States' preference to settle such issues by international agreement and
considering the uncertainty as to future provisions which may be
inserted in the new conventions on the Law of the Sea, this may be an
inopportune time to exercise the provisions of the 1935 Act, due to
possible prejudice of the United States' negotiating position.
Still another unresolved question which poses potential problems
in relation to any application of the 1935 Act to smuggling is: whether
a United States court would uphold a seizure or arrest in view of the
Mazel Toy exception indicating the possibility that the United States
has by treaty imposed upon itself a territorial restriction of its jurisdiction. 7 2 With respect to the internal application of Article 24 as a
self-imposed limitation upon the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, the approach to the issue is similar to the construction of the
liquor treaty in the Mazel Toy case, the issue turning upon whether the
treaty provisions were given a self-executing character. As pointed out
in an earlier section, while there does not seem to be any authoritative
decision in this regard, it is doubtful whether it has changed any
existing internal legislation.
In a context slightly different from that of the 1935 AntiSmuggling Act, the issue of whether Article 24 imposed a restraint on
internal legislation was brought before the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in the recent case of United States v. Winter.73 However,
72. See note 28 supra.
73. 509 F. 2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975). The Coast Guard arrested an American-owned and registered
vessel carrying 1,130 pounds of marijuana 35 miles from the coast of Florida and 11.9 miles from the
nearest island of the Bahamas. The court found adequate evidence of overt acts made in furtherance
of the conspiracy within the jurisdiction of the district court and the defendants (two American
citizens, two Jamaican nationals and one Bahamian national) were charged with conspiring to
import a controlled substance pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 952(a) and 963. With all defendants

pleading nolo contendere, the appeal by the two Americans and the two Jamaicans was limited
to challenging the trial court's jurisdiction over their persons and the crime. One of the bases for
contesting the validity of the arrest was that the Coast Guard has exceeded its jurisdiction to arrest,
which they asserted could extend only to a maximum of 12 miles from the United States coast as
prescribed by statute (14 U.S.C.A. §§ 2, 89(a)) and treaty (Article 24 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone).
The court stated that there was "little, if any current authority, construing the jurisdictional
prerequisites of the Statute" (id. at 984, n.30) and noted that most of the case law dated from the
days of prohibition construing either the former customs statutes authorizing boarding, search,
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Winter involved the boarding of a United States registered vessel,
which is authorized under Article 6(1) of the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas. Even if Article 24 were held to be self-executing, its
jurisdictional limitation would not apply
to United States flag vessels,
74
but only to those of a foreign flag.
The more difficult case, then, would be that involving a nonUnited States flag vessel boarded beyond the 12-mile customs enforcement zone whether or not under authority of the 1935 Anti-Smuggling
Act. In such a case, the court could not longer sidestep the decision
whether Article 24 is self-executing with respect to foreign flag75vessels
since the jurisdictional outcome would turn upon that issue.
Recalling the earlier discussion of whether the world community
would acquiesce in the exercise by the United States of extended
jurisdiction under the Anti-Smuggling Act and whether principles of
reciprocity would permit the United States to utilize it as against a
nonsignatory state, it is evident that there is some doubt as to how the
jurisdictional issue should be decided if the issue of application against
a nonsignatory state were brought before a United States court. Even
if a court held Article 24 to impose a 12-mile territorial restriction upon
the United States' customs jurisdiction (as a Mazel Toy exception to
Ker), 76 that jurisdictional limitation should apply only to other signatories to the convention, similarly to the application of the selfexecuting effect of the liquor treaties only to treaty states.
It may be helpful to break down the various arrest situations.
seizure and arrest within four marine leagues of the coast or the liquor treaties, giving as
examples a paragraph of citations of prohibition-era cases in which the Mazel Toy was buried.
In rejecting this jurisdictional attack, the court stated that the challenges "raise interesting
and perhaps difficult questions of law, largely unresolved by federal precedent" and went on to
say that
we do not find it necessary to decide these questions at this time, however, since we are
convinced that under a well-established case law of the Supreme Court and this Circuit,
a defendant in a federal criminal trial whether citizen or alien, whether arrested within
or beyond the territory of the United States may not successfully challenge the District
Court's jurisdiction over his person on the grounds that his presence before the Court
was unlawfully secured.
Id. at 985-86. The precedent cited for this consisted of the progeny of Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886), and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). In the latter case the Supreme Court reaffirmed
Ker, even where the defendant was forcibly abducted from another state potentially in violation of
federal kidnapping statutes. No mention was made of the territorial jurisdiction treaty limitation of
Mazel Tov (see note 28, supra) or of the question of imposing that same limitation by interpreting
Article 24 to be self-executing.
74. Thus, while it appears that the Court in Winter came to the correct result, its line of
reasoning does not deal properly with the defendant's jurisdictional challenge and does not discuss
why Article 24 would fail to eliminate the district court's jurisdiction over their persons.
75. That such a decision would be necessary is shown by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154(1) (1965) which states: "Whether an
-international agreement of the United States is or is not self-executing is finally determined as a
matter of interpretation by courts of the United States if the issue arises in litigation." Whether
established by treaty or custom, international law cannot be disregarded by a court in the
adjudication of cases applying internal law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Accord,
Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REv. 241 (1923).
76. See note 28 supra.
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Assuming a conspiracy with overt acts or agreement within the court's
jurisdiction and a seizure or arrest outside the 12-mile customs enforcement zone, under international law principles or case law precedent, a court might resolve the jurisdictional issues as follows:
Circumstances of arrest

Would court assert
jurisdiction?

1. U.S. flag vessel, U.S. citizen
or alien arrested

2. Foreign Flag of state nonsignatory to Convention on Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone,
under Anti-Smuggling Act,
alien arrested
2(a) Same as above, U.S. citizen arrested

Yes

3. Foreign flag of signatory
state to Convention on Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone,
under Anti-Smuggling Act,
alien arrested
3(a). Same as above, U.S. citizen arrested

Yes, if Art. 24
not self-executing

4. Foreign flag of state nonsignatory to Convention on Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone,
without application of AntiSmuggling Act, alien arrested.
4(a). Same as above, U.S. citizen arrested

Yes

5. Foreign flag of signatory
state to Convention on Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone,
without application of AntiSmuggling Act, alien arrested
5(a). Same as above, U.S. citizen arrested

Yes

No, if Art. 24
is self-executing
Yes

Yes

Yes, if Art. 24
is not self-executing
No, if Art. 24
is self-executing
Yes

Jurisdictionalbasis
or lack thereof
Law of the flag, Art. 6 of High
Seas Convention, Restate. 2d,
Foreign Relations Law, 1965
§ 32(1)(a)"7 Ker-Frisbie, Winter
Anti-Smuggling Act, Ker-Frisbie, et al.

Anti-Smuggling Act, Ker-Frisbie, et al. Active PersonalityNationality
Anti-Smuggling Act, Ker-Frisbie, et al.

Mazel Toy exception to Ker.
Anti-Smuggling Act, Ker-Frisbie, et al. Active PersonalityNationality
Ker-Frisbie, et al.

Ker-Frisbie, et al. Active
Personality-Nationality
Ker-Frisbie, et al.
Mazel Toy exception to Ker.
Ker-Frisbie, et al. Active Personality-Nationality

With the exception of the first situation, it is likely that a foreign
state would assert a diplomatic protest in all cases where a foreign
vessel had been boarded beyond the 12-mile customs zone under the
customary international law principle of freedom of the high seas
without regard to whether the boarding or arrest had been undertaken
pursuant to the Anti-Smuggling Act, the countervailing defense being
all of the previously discussed commentary that such protective assertions of customs jurisdiction were "reasonable." On the premise, then,
that to a United States court it would be irrelevant whether the
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defendant's person had been brought before the court by legal or illegal
means (with an exception when the arrest had violated a self-imposed
territorially restrictive treaty), what value would lie in the use of the
Anti-Smuggling Act to effect an arrest beyond the 12-mile enforcement
zone? Whether determinative of jurisdiction or not, compliance with
the Act would cloak such an extra-territorial arrest with a greater aura
of internal legality than would exist were it not used. This would be
useful in bolstering the validity of jurisdiction of a United States court
as well as in providing at least an internal law defense to a later civil
suit by the defendant against arresting officials alleging damages
78
caused by an illegally accomplished arrest.

V. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
In maintaining an effective attack on narcotics smuggling, a
number of alternatives to the use of the Anti-Smuggling Act should be
taken under consideration. Most obvious would be the inclusion in any
new convention on the high seas or contiguous zone of a provision
which either would add illicit narcotics traffic to the list of acts for
which principles of universal jurisdiction may be extended (similar to
the slave trade) or would offer more flexibility generally on the part of
a coastal state to protect its coastal interests. Due to the desire to
achieve consensus in the new Law of the Seas conventions, however, it
is doubtful whether such a proposal would meet with much success
since, by distilling each article down to the lowest common denominator to achieve consensus, it is likely that the required flexibility
would be lost. Suppression of international drug traffic is in many
ways analogous to the pursuance of peace: all states profess it as a
common goal, but there exist wide differences of opinion on the proper
means of securing it. Furthermore, by the couching of universal jurisdiction or extended flexibility within the provisions of a law of the sea
convention, specters of abuse and harassment of ships on the high seas
would be raised to a greater extent than if the same agreement were
made in a different context.
77. Section 32(1)(a) provides that "a state having jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law has
jurisdiction to enforce the rule outside of its territory . . . aboald a vessel or aircraft having its
nationality while under the control of its commanding officer."
78. Events at the on-going sessions of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea could significantly change the likely non-self-executing nature of articles equivalent to the
present Article 24. One of the declared objectives of the conference is to fashion an agreement
which is acceptable to all the participants, the idea being that by adhering to a rule of consensus,

when the instrument is adopted, it will become "instantaneous customary international law"
thereby circumventing the confusing problems of which states are bound by it vis-A-vis which

other states and whether the 1958 Conventions have any continuing efficacy for their signatories
which are not bound by Article 24. If this consensus objective is successful and a similar

restrictive customs enforcement limitation is included, it is much more likely to be interpreted as
having a self-executing character than is the present Article 24 of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. To the extent that such a limitation would be in conflict
with provisions of the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act, the Act's utility and effectiveness would be

seriously undermined.
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Such a context might be the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs. While the original text of that convention contains language
alluding to international, cooperative action, 79 it apparently has not

been interpreted as falling within the descriptive phrase, "Except
where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty,..."

of the Convention on the High Seas, which would permit states to
exercise jurisdiction on the high seas under the principle of universality. The 1961 Single Convention does however, have 106 signatories at
present, indicating a high degree of consensus as to the principles

embodied in its text. There have been several protocols to this convention since 1961 and it would seem likely that another would be met
with approval by a number of states which would be willing to agree
to an extended enforcement zone on the part of reciprocating coastal

states in regard to narcotic drugs smuggling. By attaching such a
protocol to the narcotic drugs convention, a greater number of agreeing states might be anticipated, in addition to the advantage of not
being burdened by the consensus target prevailing at the Law of the
Sea Conference.
Another approach may lie with single bilateral agreements similar
to the liquor treaties of the 1920's. Although the treaties were limited
solely to alcohol smuggling and did not include narcotic drugs, the
1935 Anti-Smuggling Act, although gaining its primary impetus from

liquor smuggling, is not limited to that. 80
A parallel might be drawn to the attack on slave trading, the
development of which assumed the pattern of initial internal prohibit-

ing legislation, followed by bilateral and multilateral international
79. See, e.g., the Preamble:
Considering that effective measures against abuse of narcotic drugs requires coordinated
and universal action.
Understanding that such universal action calls for international cooperation guided by the
same principles and aimed at common objectives. ...
and Article 35:
The Parties shall:
(b) Assist each other in the campaign against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs;
(c) Cooperate closely with each other and with the competent international organizations of which they are members with a view to maintaining a coordinated campaign
against the illicit traffic; . . .
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, March 30, 1961 [1961] 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No.
6298.
80. This is evidenced by the testimony at the hearings:
Mr. McCormack. "But this goes beyond liquor, as it should. You have other things in
mind besides liquor, as you should."
Mr. Hester. "Yes."
Mr. McCormack. "Particularly if you have drugs in mind you have a much stronger
case. That is really one of the main things you have in mind, is it not?"
Mr. Hester. "No, the particular thing that we have in mind is the stopping of the liquor
smuggling into the United States. That is what this bill is really aimed at."
Mr. McCormack. "Yes, but you also have drugs in mind, have you not?"
Mr. Hester. "This is an enabling act which later on can be extended and enlarged if it is
necessary."
Mr. McCormack. "But you have also drugs in mind, have you not?"
Mr. Hester. "Yes, we have drugs in mind."
1935 Hearings, supra note 8, at 40.
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agreements until a general consensus was obtained and incorporated as
an act under the universal jurisdiction of the High Seas Convention. If
the United States believes that it would be desirable ultimately to place
narcotics traffic under that same principle of universality, but that it is
doubtful whether the international community is now ready to take
such a large step, it may consider the best beginning to engage in
treaties and protocols as a means of swaying international sentiment in
that direction. Assuming that any new provision in a Law of the Sea
Convention did not totally destroy the effectiveness of the AntiSmuggling Act, the Act itself might be useful in the formation of a
trade-off to encourage bilateral treaties using a policy similar to the
reversal of the effects of Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon"1 as a trade-off for
82
the liquor treaties.
If attempts at treaties or protocols are unsuccessful or if for any
reason it is determined that those approaches would not be in the
United States' best interests, the only remaining method of dealing
with hovering vessels suspected of engaging in smuggling would be on
a case-by-case basis, requesting permission to board the vessel from
the flag state through diplomatic channels. Although this would involve a greater amount of effort and a loss of time (although probably
no more than forwarding a request to the Secretary of Transportation
as the President's representative to designate a customs enforcement
zone under the 1935 Act), upon furnishing assurances that all proper
protection would be afforded the vessel in terms of requiring probable
cause for a search and seizure, most states would grant permission to
the United States Coast Guard to investigate and, as long as investigative efforts were confined to the scope granted by that permission, the
United States would be assured of not provoking an international
protest.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Historically, hovering legislation and assertions of coastal state
competence for limited purposes of protecting revenues, morals, security or enforcement of internal legislation upon the high seas in areas
contiguous to the coast have been accepted under customary international law.
81. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
82. A treaty might be proposed, for instance, wherein the United States agrees not to employ

the 62-mile extent of the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act against drug-smuggling activities or vessels of
state X if state X agrees not to object to the boarding and searching of hovering narcotics laden
vessels flying state X's flag within some lesser distance than 62 miles or within a stipulated sailing
time of the United States coast. But since no country officially sanctions the use of its registered
vessels to carry on trade in narcotics as compared to the approval of liquor commerce in the
1920's, there would be less compelling motivation for any state to enter such a bargain. Such an
approach would also presume that the United States had something of "real value" to trade off.
In view of the isolated cases in which the Act has been applied and even then, never to its fullest
extent against a foreign flag vessel, a more recent application of the Act (preferably a successful
one to demonstrate continued viability) against a foreign flag vessel would be almost a prerequisite to any attempt to bargain away its provisions.
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2. The 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act was drafted meticulously to
comply with the standard of reasonableness required of hovering or
contiguous zone legislation under international law. Congressional
hearings gave primary attention to assuring that the Act complied with
international law and it was passed in the belief that it was a reasonable exercise of jurisdiction. The United States State Department did
not submit an objection to the enactment nor did the department
affirmatively support it.
3. Post-1935 commentary by international law authorities generally confirms its compliance with and reasonableness under international law.
4. Article 24 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone has generally not been interpreted as self-executing,
although no authoritative decision in this regard has been made. Thus,
the 1935 Anti-Smuggling Act's continued efficacy as valid internal
legislation has not been destroyed by the 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions.
5. There is a substantial body of international law writers and
publicists who believe that, in view of the failure of most signatories to
accept the literal wording of Article 24 (authorizing punitive measures
in the contiguous zone only for violations committed in the coastal
territory or its territorial sea), and considering the prevalence of states,
assertions of fisheries contiguous zones and the taking of security
measures beyond the territorial sea, states will continue to act as they
did before the 1958 Conventions came into force. Assuming the coastal
state's claim to be reasonable, it will probably continue to be accepted
by the international community. This is based on the premise that the
coastal state's interests and objectives must necessarily be of variable
strength and distance and that a 12-mile boundary to protect any and
all interests is too inflexible.
6. On the other hand, the United States may feel bound by the
12-mile provision of Article 24 and thus unwilling to exercise its
enforcement jurisdiction to the extent authorized by the 1935 AntiSmuggling Act. With respect to nonsignatories of the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, however, the principles of
reciprocity and mutuality should release the United States from the
12-mile limitation of Article 24, unless its provisions have fallen into
the domain of customary international law. The existence of such
custom is doubtful, considering that there are only 43 signatories,
which are not, themselves, adhering fully to the literal language of
Article 24. Even if Article 24 were held to be self-executing, any
United States territorial jurisdiction limitation imposed thereby would
be available only to vessels of signatory states as a jurisdictional
challenge in a United States court.
7. Considering the United States State Department's policy of
settling issues of a coastal state's competence to apply its laws in areas
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of the high seas through agreement rather than by unilateral declarations, and weighing the potential effect of unilateral declarations of
high seas competence upon positions and negotiations currently under
consideration within the international community in attempting to
reach an agreement on a new Law of the Sea Convention, it may be
advisable not to use the extended provisions of the 1935 AntiSmuggling Act until the delineation of a new territorial sea or contiguous enforcement zone is internationally agreed upon, at which time the
advisability of using it should be reassessed.
8. Due to the consensus objective prevailing at the sessions of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, any new
provision territorially restricting a coastal state's enforcement competence may be interpreted to be customary international law which
would supersede prior inconsistent internal legislation. If such action
would appear to threaten the continued validity of the Anti-Smuggling
Act, consideration should be given to dealing with the issue of an
international attack on narcotics smuggling under the new Law of the
Sea Convention itself.
9. If a consensus regarding an international attack on narcotics
smuggling is doubtful or unsuccessful and use of the Anti-Smuggling
Act is ineffectual or inadvisable, it may be wisest to address the issue
of a coastal state's right to attack narcotics smuggling in areas extending more than 12 miles into the high seas in a different context, by a
protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics or by separate
multilateral or bilateral treaties, providing assurance that adequate
protections would be observed prior to instituting a search or seizure of
a foreign flag vessel.
10. An ultimate enforcement mode objective in suppressing international narcotics traffic should be determined, that is, whether it
would be desirable to place such an offense under principles of universal jurisdiction or merely to permit reciprocal enforcement between
certain states, proceeding with the course of action best calculated to
achieve that objective.

